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GENERALIZED EXTERNALITY GAMES
ABSTRACT. Externality games are studied in Grafe et al. (1998, Math. Methods
Op. Res. 48, 71). We define a generalization of this class of games and show,
using the methodology in Izquierdo and Rafels (1996, 2001, Working paper, Univ
Barcelona; Games Econ. Behav. 36, 174), some properties of the new class of gen-
eralized externality games. They include, among others, the algebraic structure of
the game, convexity, and their implications for the study of cooperative solutions.
Also the proportional rule is characterized for this class of games.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative games deal with situations in which the different sub-
sets of a set of players (called coalitions) have a well defined ex-
pectation of what to get by working alone. The mathematical model
requires defining a real function (called characteristic function) that
assigns a number to every coalition of players. Then, the formal
objective of the cooperative game theory is to give a number to each
player taking into account the information available in the charac-
teristic function. Sometimes the solution is a vector (where each
component is a player’s payoff) and other times it is a set of vec-
tors (including the empty set). The different solutions are often in-
terpreted as different normative proposals to share the benefits of
forming the coalition of all players.
Although the study of the consequences of different normative
motivations to share profits is by itself an interesting field of re-
search, many authors have stressed the economic applications of
the model. This approach has two consequences. First, cooperat-
ive game theory will play a role in Economics as long as some
interesting economic situations can be modeled via a characteristic
function. Second, the characteristic function of a particular eco-
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nomic situation will typically have more structure than more general
ones, and this may imply in turn more results and interpretations.
In the literature of cooperative games, there are many examples
of characteristic functions obtained after a more primite economic
model. Among them, we can list bankruptcy games (see a survey
in Thomson, 2002), airport games (Littlechild and Thomson, 1977),
market games (Shubik, 1984 and references therein), and, more rel-
evant to our work, externality games (Grafe et al.,1998) and finan-
cial games (Izquierdo and Rafels, 1996).
In the present work we define the class of generalized externality
games, GEG, which include externality games as defined by Grafe
et al. (1998). The characteristic function of GEG can be separated
into two functions, one that depends on the totality of the resources
belonging to the coalition, and another that depends on the num-
ber of members of the coalition. Then, using the methodology in
Izquierdo and Rafels (1996, 2001), we study some properties of this
new class of games. In particular, we find that each of the families
that form the class of GEG has a vectorial space structure, and
furthermore, that minimum participation games form an interesting
base. Next we show that GEG are semi-convex, but not convex, and
show sufficient conditions for convexity. It is also shown that GEG
belong to the family of average monotonic games.
The importance of these properties becomes clear when we study
different solution concepts. In the spirit of many other works we
define a proportional solution for GEG and present an axiomatic
characterization. The vectorial space structure of GEG and the fact
that minimum participation games constitute a base are used in
showing this result. Interestingly enough, the axiomatization of the
proportional solution for GEG is the same as for financial games,
but is not a generalization of the axiomatization for externality
games.
From the above mentioned properties it follows that the core of
GEG is non empty, as the proportional solution is always in it,
and that the core and the bargaining set coincide. The conditions
for convexity are useful if one is interested in GEG for which the
Shapley value is in the core. Finally, the property of semi-convexity
allows us to use a simple formula for another solution concept, the
τ -value.
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Finally, we show some examples to illustrate the applications
of the mentioned definitions and results. When studying a class of
GEG, the provision of a public good, we find the remarkable result
that the Shapley value and the proportional solution coincide.
In Section 2 we define generalized externality games and provide
some economic examples. In Section 3 we prove some properties.
Section 4 characterizes the proportional solution. Section 5 discusses
other solution concepts. Section 6 presents some applications and
Section 7 concludes.
2. DEFINITION AND EXAMPLES
Externality games were introduced by Grafe et al. (1998) as a class
of cooperative games. In this section we present a generalization of
these games and show some interesting economic situations that can
be interpreted as generalized externality games.
Using conventional notation, N will denote the set of character-
istic form games played by a given set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of players.
In these games, each subset S ⊂ N (called a coalition) is associated
with a value v (S). Denote by 2N the set of subsets of N.
DEFINITION 1. A game v ∈ N is a generalized externality game,
GEG, if there exists a vector β = (βi)i∈N in N+ , a parameter α ≥
1, and a non-decreasing function r : 2N → +, such that v (S) =
(
∑
i∈S βi)αr (s), where s denotes the cardinal of coalition S. The
set of generalized externality games of N players will be denoted
by GEGN .
When α = 1, Definition 1 coincides with the definition of ex-
ternality games. Generalized externality games can be interpreted
as a situation in which players contribute both with their endow-
ments (βi) and their presence (through the function r) to the co-
alition where they belong. One can easily check that these games
are monotone and superadditive. Monotonicity requires that v (S) ≤
v (T ) whenever S ⊂ T , whereas superadditivity means that v (S) +
v (T ) ≤ v (S ∪ T ) for all coalitions such that S ∩ T = ∅.
EXAMPLE 1 (Provision of public goods): Consider the following
model in Moulin (1992). Let A be a set of public decisions and
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denote by c(a) the cost of financing decision a. A set of agents,
N = {1, 2, ..., n}, must share the cost of decision a. A feasible out-
come is a vector (a; y1, ..., yn) where a ∈ A; ∑i∈N yi = c(a), and
yi is agent i’s cost share. Preferences are represented by ui(a, yi).
Suppose now that we have a quadratic cost function and linear utilit-
ies; i.e., c(a) = a2/2 and ui(a, yi) = βia − yi , where the parameter
βi is agent i’s marginal rate of substitution between private and
public goods. To compute the surplus v(S) generated by coalition
S standing alone solve
maxa,yi
∑
i∈S
(βia − yi)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
yi = a2/2
to get
∑
i∈S
βi = a. Then
v(S) = max
a,yi
(∑
i∈S
(βia) − a2/2
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
βi
∑
i∈S
βi
)
−
(∑
i∈S
βi
)2
/2
=
(∑
i∈S
βi
)2
/2,
and a generalized externality game is defined with r (s) = 12 and
α = 2.
EXAMPLE 2 (Joint venture): Suppose that a set N = {1, 2, ..., n}
of firms decides to collaborate in a joint venture, and that each firm
participates with two factors. One of them, βi (e.g., labor) is idio-
syncratic to each firm and the other, K (e.g., capital) must be equal
for all firms. If the technology of the joint venture can be repres-
ented by a Cobb–Douglas function of the form f
(
K,
∑
i∈N βi
) =(∑
i∈N βi
)α
(nK)δ we can define a cooperative game where v(S) =(∑
i∈S βi
)α
(sK)δ if we consider the possibility of coalitions of firms
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having their own joint venture. Finally, a generalized externality
game is defined if α ≥ 1. In this case r(s) = (sK)δ. Firms may
use a solution of this game to decide upon a division of revenues
generated by this activity.
3. PROPERTIES OF GENERALIZED EXTERNALITY GAMES.
It is well known that characteristic form games are a vectorial space
of dimension 2N−1, and that unanimity games constitute a base of
this space. This algebraic structure has proved very useful in the
study of cooperative games. It is therefore important to know, for
a given class of characteristic form games, whether it preserves the
structure of vectorial space and whether one can find an interesting
base. In the next proposition we show that this is indeed the case for
each one of the subclasses that constitute the class of generalized
externality games. To this end we need the following definition.
Coalitions will be denoted by upper case letters and their cardinality
by the corresponding lower case letter.
DEFINITION 2. A game of minimum participation associated with
a vector β and a coalition T is denoted by vT,β and defined as:
vT,β (S) = 0 if s < t or
if s = t and
∑
i∈S
βi <
∑
i∈T
βi ,
vT,β (S) =
∑
i∈S
βi if s ≥ t or
if s = t and
∑
i∈S
βi ≥
∑
i∈T
βi .
The set of games of minimum participation associated with a
generalized externality game v, denoted by vβ , is defined by vβ =
(vT , β)T∈2N .
Minimum participation games are very simple. If a coalition is
not big enough, it can guarantee nothing to its members, otherwise
it guarantees only the sum of what the members contribute via the
parameters βi .
5
For a given game consider a maximal set of coalitions satisfying
that, for every two coalitions S and T , either their cardinal is dif-
ferent, s 
= t , or ∑i∈S βi 
= ∑i∈T βi . Then define the set L ={S0, S1, ..., Sm}, where (i) sk−1 < sk or (ii) if sk−1 = sk, then∑
i∈Sk−1 βi <
∑
i∈Sk βi . Coalitions out of this set will be identified
with a coalition in the set with the same cardinal and same amount
of resources. Now we can state a proposition about the algebraic
structure of the GEGN that will be useful when studying solutions
for these games. Denote by GEGN(α, β) the subset of GEGN with
parameter α and with vector β of endowments of coalitions.
PROPOSITION 1. Given a game in GEGN(α, β), define a set L of
coalitions as before. Then, the set of minimum participation games
associated with coalitions in L, vβ = (vT,β)T ∈L, form a base of
GEGN(α, β).
Proof. First show that games in vβ = (vT,β)T ∈L are linearly
independent. This means that∑
T∈L
λT vT,β = 0N, (1)
where 0N is the vector in N with a zero in each component, has
λT = 0 for all T . Suppose that this is not the case and that there
exists a λT 
= 0. Select a coalition S ∈ L such that λS 
= 0, s ≤ t
for all T ∈ L, and whenever s = t , ∑i∈S βi < ∑i∈T βi. We can
rewrite (1) as
vS,β(S) =
∑
T 
=S∈L
−λT
λS
vT,β (S)
=
∑
T :t<s
−λT
λS
vT,β (S) +
∑
T :t>s
−λT
λS
vT,β (S)
+
∑
T :t=s∑
i∈T βi>
∑
i∈S βi
−λT
λS
vT,β (S) +
∑
T :t=s∑
i∈T βi<
∑
i∈S βi
−λT
λS
vT,β (S)
=
∑
T :t<s
−λT
λS
vT,β (S) =
∑
T :t<s
−λT
λS
∑
i∈S
βi
Notice that in the expression in the middle, all terms are zero
except for the first. In the second and third, vT,β (S) = 0 because
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of the definition of minimum participation games, and in the fourth
λT = 0 for all T because of the way S was chosen. From
vS,β(S) =
∑
T :t<s
−λT
λS
∑
i∈S
βi
we have∑
T :t<s
−λT
λS
= 1 as vS,β(S) =
∑
i∈S
βi.
But this means that λT 
= 0 for some T , in contradiction with the
way S was chosen.
Now we show that every v ∈ GEGN(α, β) can be written as a
linear combination of games of minimum participation. To this end
notice that, given any v ∈ GEGN(α, β), for any S ⊂ N, there exists
a coalition Sh ∈ L such that ∑i∈Sh βi = ∑i∈S βi and sh = s. Now
consider the linear combination
∑
Sk∈L λSkvSk,β , with λSk defined as
λSk =
v (Sk)∑
i∈Sk
βi
− v (Sk−1)∑
i∈Sk−1
βi
then we have
∑
Sk∈L
λSkvSk,β (S) =
∑
Sk∈L

 v (Sk)∑
i∈Sk
βi
− v (Sk−1)∑
i∈Sk−1
βi

 vSk,β (S)
=
∑
Sk∈L:sk<s

 v (Sk)∑
i∈Sk
βi
− v (Sk−1)∑
i∈Sk−1
βi


∑
i∈S
βi
+
∑
Sk∈L:sk=s∑
i∈Sk βi≤
∑
i∈S βi

 v (Sk)∑
i∈Sk
βi
− v (Sk−1)∑
i∈Sk−1
βi


∑
i∈S
βi
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+
∑
Sk∈L:sk=s∑
i∈Sk βi>
∑
i∈S βi

 v (Sk)∑
i∈Sk
βi
− v (Sk−1)∑
i∈Sk−1
βi

 vSk,β (S)
+
∑
Sk∈L:sk>s

 v (Sk)∑
i∈Sk
βi
− v (Sk−1)∑
i∈Sk−1
βi

 vSk,β (S)
= v (S)
This completes the proof.
This property of generalized externality games will be used in the
next section, when the proportional rule is axiomatized for these
games.
Another interesting property for cooperative games is convexity
as it allows relating different solution concepts. However, convexity
is a too strong concept for many purposes. Weaker versions of this
concept have been developed, among them, semiconvexity. Next we
show that GEGN are semiconvex, but not convex.
DEFINITION 3. (Driessen and Tijs, 1985) A cooperative game
(N, v) is semiconvex if (i) v (N) − v (N\ {i}) ≥ v ({i}) , and (ii)
v (S)−∑j∈S\{i}(v (N)−v(N\ {j })) ≤ v ({i}) for all individuals
and coalitions.
PROPOSITION 2. Generalized externality games are semiconvex.
Proof. To show that (i) in the definition is satisfied recall that
βαi r (1) ≤ βαi r (n) . Then
βαi r (1) ≤

 ∑
j∈N\i
βj


α
(r (n) − r (n − 1))
+
(
α
1
) ∑
j∈N\i
βj


α−1
βir (n) + ... +
(
α
α
)
βαi r (n)
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=
(∑
i∈N
βi
)α
r (n) −

 ∑
j∈N\i
βj


α
r (n − 1) .
To show (ii):
βαi r (1) ≥

∑
j∈S
βj


α
r (s) − (s − 1)

∑
i∈S
βi +
∑
i∈N\S
βi


α
r (n)
−
∑
j∈S\i

 ∑
i∈N\j
βi


α
r (n − 1)
=

∑
j∈S
βj


α
r (s) − (s − 1)
(∑
i∈N
βi
)α
r (n)
−
∑
j∈S\i

 ∑
i∈N\j
βi


α
r (n − 1)
=

∑
j∈S
βj


α
r (s) −
∑
j∈S\i
(∑
i∈N
βi
)α
r (n)
−

 ∑
i∈N\j
βi


α
r (n − 1) .
This property of GEGN will be helpful in providing a simple for-
mula to compute the τ -value, a cooperative solution.
Generalized externality games are not convex in general, as shown
in an example below. Next we show a sufficient condition for a class
of generalized externality games to be convex.
DEFINITION 4. A cooperative game (N, v) is convex if v(S ∪
{i, j }) − v(S ∪ {j }) ≥ v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S) for all S ⊂ N , i, j /∈ S.
The next proposition shows that if the function r (.) increases suffi-
ciently fast, then the game is convex.
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PROPOSITION 3. Let (N, v) be a symmetric generalized extern-
ality game with α ∈ N , then, if
r (s + 1)
r (s)
> 2,
the game v is convex.
Proof. Recall that symmetry means that v(S ∪ {j }) = v (S ∪ {i})
for all S ⊂ N , i, j ∈ N . The condition of convexity for symmetric
games can be written as
2v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S) ≤ v(S ∪ {i, j }) for all i, j /∈ S. (2)
In the case of generalized externality games symmetry implies
∑
i∈S
βi = ∑i∈T βi whenever s = t, and we can write
2v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S)
= 2
(∑
k∈S
βk + βi
)α
r (s + 1) −
(∑
k∈S
βk
)α
r (s)
and
v(S ∪ {i, j }) =
[(∑
k∈S
βk
)α
+
(
α
1
)(∑
k∈S
βk
)α−1
(βi + βj) + ...
... + (βi + βj )α
]
r (s + 2) .
To verify (2) write
2
(∑
k∈S
βk + βi
)α
r (s + 1)
r (s + 2) −
(∑
k∈S
βk
)α
r (s)
r (s + 2)
=
(∑
k∈S
βk
)α
2r (s + 1) − r (s)
r (s + 2)
+

( α
1
)(∑
k∈S
βk
)α−1
(βi) + ...

 2r (s + 1)
r (s + 2)
≤
(∑
k∈S
βk
)α
2r (s + 1) − r (s)
r (s + 2)
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+ 2
(
α
1
)(∑
k∈S
βk
)α−1
(βi)
r (s + 1)
2r (s + 2) + ...
≤


(∑
k∈S
βk
)α
+
(
α
1
)(∑
k∈S
βk
)α−1
(βi + βj ) + ...
... + (βi + βj )α

 = v(S ∪ {i, j })
r (s + 2)
as required by convexity.
Counterexample: Consider the generalized externality game defined
by N = {1, 2, 3}, β = (1, 2, 20), α = 2, and r (1) = 1, r (2) = 3,
and r (3) = 4. This game is not convex as, for example, v ({3} ∪
{2, 1}) − v ({3} ∪ {1}) = 793, whereas v ({3} ∪ {2}) − v ({3}) =
1, 052.
Another property of interest relates GEG with the class of aver-
age monotonic games (Izquierdo and Rafels, 2001). This is formal-
ized in the next proposition.
DEFINITION 5. (Izquierdo and Rafels, 2001) A cooperative game
(N, v) is average monotonic if
(i) v (S) ≥ 0 for all coalitions S ⊂ N , and
(ii) there exists a vector α ∈ N+\ {0} such that (
∑
i∈T αi)v (S) ≤
(
∑
i∈S αi)v (T ) for S ⊂ T ⊂ N .
PROPOSITION 4. GEG are average monotonic.
Proof. To show (i) in Definition 5 see that βi ≥ 0 and r (s) ≥ 0
imply v (S) ≥ 0. To show (ii) let α = β. Then
v (S)∑
i∈S
αi
=
(∑
i∈S
βi
)α
r (s)
∑
i∈S
βi
=
(∑
i∈S
βi
)α−1
r (s)
≤
(∑
i∈T
βi
)α−1
r (t) = v (T )∑
i∈T
αi
.
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The inequality holds because both r and xα−1 with α ≥ 1 are
increasing functions.
4. THE PROPORTIONAL SOLUTION
Proportional solutions have been suggested in many contexts, like
bankruptcy problems (see O’Neill, 1982; Chun, 1988; Thomson,
1995). Typically, in cooperative games, the proportional solution is
presented as giving each player the part of what the grand coalition
can get that is proportional to its value. I.e.,
pi (v) = v (i)∑
j∈N
v (j)
v (N) .
However, this is not the only possibility. In games with more struc-
ture, there may be other elements that are good candidates to define
proportionality (claims, initial endowments,...). For GEG we pro-
vide the following definition.
DEFINITION 6. (Adapted from Izquierdo and Rafels, 2001, to
GEG). Let (N, v) be a generalized externality game with β =
(β1, ..., βn) as players’ endowments, then the proportional solution,
p(v, β) ∈ n is defined as
p(v, β) = (pi(v, β))i∈N =

 βi∑
i∈N
βi
v (N)


i∈N
.
Grafe et al. (1998) define the proportional rule for externality
games as (v, β) = (i(v, β))i∈N = (βiv (N))i∈N . For these
games, the definition above gives
pi(v, β) = βi∑
i∈N
βi
v (N) = βi∑
i∈N
βi
∑
i∈N
βiv (n) = βiv (n)
= i(v, β).
12
Thus Definition 6 generalizes the proportional solution for external-
ity games.
Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) and Grafe et al. (1998) present an
axiomatic characterization of the proportional solution for finan-
cial games (a subset of average monotonic games) and externality
games, respectively. We show that, for GEG, the characterization
in Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) applies, but that the one in Grafe
et al. (1998) does not. It is easy to show that generalized external-
ity games satisfy the following properties (listed in Izquierdo and
Rafels (1996)).
– Individual pseudo-rationality (IPR): if v (N) ≥ ∑i∈N βi , then
pi(v, β) ≥ βi . This means that, if the grand coalition can get
more than the total amount of endowments provided by the
individuals, each player gets, at least, her endowment.
– Efficiency (EF): ∑i∈N pi = v (N).
– Restricted linearity (RL): Let v1 and v2 be two games in GEGN
with the same vector β, then
(i) if v1+v2 is a GEGN with the same vector β, then pi(v1, β)
+ pi(v2, β) = pi(v1 + v2, β), and
(ii) pi(λv1, β) = λpi(v1, β) for all λ ∈ +.
Restricted linearity will be discussed later, when we compare the
proportional solution with other solutions.
The next proposition shows the sufficiency of these properties to
characterize the proportional solution for GEGN .
PROPOSITION 5. The proportional solution is the only solution
that satisfies IPR, EF and RL within the set of GEGN .
Proof. Let v ∈ GEGN , with v (N) ≥ ∑i∈N βi , and consider
a solution n that satisfies IPR, EF and RL, then we show that it
coincides with the proportional solution. By Proposition 1 v can be
expressed as v = ∑mk=1 λSkvSk,β , where
λSk =
v (Sk)∑
i∈Sk
βi
− v (Sk−1)∑
i∈Sk−1
βi
,
and vSk,β are minimum participation games.
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Using properties IPR and RL we can write
i(v, β) = i
(
m∑
k=1
λSkvSk,β, β
)
=
m∑
k=1
λSki(vSk,β, β)
≥
m∑
k=1
λSkβi =
v (N)∑
i∈N
βi
βi = pi(v, β).
By EF of the proportional solution it must be i(v, β) = pi(v, β)
for all i ∈ N .
For games with v (N) <
∑
i∈N βi define a new game v′ = λv
with λ ∈ + such that v′ (N) ≥ ∑i∈N βi. For this game we have
i(v
′, β) = pi(v′, β). By (ii) in RL it must be that i(v, β)
pi(v, β).
Grafe et al. (1998) provide a characterization of the proportional
solution for externality games (GEG with α = 1). However, this
result cannot be generalized to generalized externality games. The
axioms in Grafe et al.(1998) for a solution  on EGN are:
– Individual rationality (IR): for all v in EGN , i (v) ≥ βir (1) .
– Monotonicity (M): for all v (β, r) and v (β, r ′) in EGN : if
r (t) ≤ r ′ (t) for all t ∈ {1, ..., n} then i (v (β, r)) ≤
i
(
v
(
β, r ′
))
.
– Efficiency (EF): As before.
It is straightforward to show that the proportional solution verifies
these axioms for the class of generalized externality games. How-
ever, it is not characterized by them, as there are other solutions that
satisfy the same set of axioms. For instance, take the solution 	
defined by
	i = β
α
i∑
j∈N
βαj
v (N) .
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This solution clearly satisfies EF and M. To show that it also satisfies
IR write
	i = β
α
i∑
j∈N
βαj
v (N) = β
α
i∑
j∈N
βαj

∑
j∈N
βj


α
r (n)
≥ β
α
i∑
j∈N
βαj

∑
j∈N
βj


α
r (1) =
(∑
i∈N
βj
)α
∑
j∈N
βαj
v (i) ≥ v (i) .
The last inequality holds because (
∑
i∈N βj)α ≥
∑
j∈N βαj for
α ≥ 1.
5. OTHER SOLUTIONS OF GEGN.
Izquierdo and Rafels (2001) show that the core of average mono-
tonic games is non empty and that it contains the proportional solu-
tion. They also show that the core coincides with the two most
important definitions of bargaining set presented in Aumann and
Maschler (1964) and in Mas-Colell (1989). Since generalized ex-
ternality games are average monotonic, the same properties apply.
The reader is referred to the mentioned works for definitions and
details on the core and bargaining sets.
Grafe et al. (1998) show an example of an externality game (and,
a fortiori, a GEG) where the Shapley value is not in the core.
When the game is convex, the Shapley value is in the core. Pro-
position 4 provided a sufficient condition for GEG to be convex.
Next we define the Shapley value for the sake of completeness, and
because it will be used in the next section, where its relation with
the proportional solution will be explored.
DEFINITION 7. The Shapley value is defined as the only solution
Sh(v) that satisfies the following four properties:
(i) Symmetry (SYM): if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j }) for all S ⊂ N −
{i, j }, then i(v) = j(v),
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(ii) Additivity (ADD): (v + w) = (v) + (w),
(iii) Eficiency (EF): ∑i∈N i(v) = v(N), and
(iv) Dummy player (DP): if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) a for all S ⊂ N then
i(v) = 0.
It can be shown that
Shi(v) =
∑
i /∈T
t ! (n − t − 1)!
n! [v (T ∪ {i}) − v (T )] . (3)
Tijs (1981) proposes the solution concept called the τ -value. The
motivation for this value is that it represents a compromise among
players, as it gives every player a payoff between a superior and an
inferior bound. The superior bound is defined as Mv = (Mvi )i∈N ,
with Mvi = v (N) − v (N\ {i}) , while the inferior bound is mv =
(mvi )i∈N , with mvi = maxS⊂N\{i}[v(S ∪ {i} −
∑
j∈S Mvj )]. See that
the superior bound has the marginal contribution of every player to
the grand coalition, and that the inferior bound has the minimum
payoff that players have after the other players in the coalition are
given their superior bound. The τ -value is defined only for quasi-
equilibrated games. These are games that satisfy
∑
i∈S mvi ≤ v (N)≤ ∑i∈S Mvi and mvi ≤ Mvi for all i ∈ N . Games with a non-
empty core are quasi-equilibrated. Thus the τ -value is well defined
for GEG.
DEFINITION 8. The τ -value of a quasi-equilibrated game is de-
fined as the only efficient point that lies on the segment joining the
superior and inferior bounds.
Driessen and Tijs (1985) show that, for games with a non-empty
core, the τ−value can be computed using the formula τ(v)= (1 − δ)
mv + δMv, where
δ =
v (N) −
∑
i∈N
mvi
∑
i∈S
Mvi −
∑
i∈N
mvi
.
This formula can be used for games in GEGN.
Driessen and Tijs (1983) also show that, for balanced semiconvex
games with at most four players, the τ -value belongs to the core. As
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generalized externality games are both balanced and semiconvex,
the same applies for these games whenever N ≤ 4. For the general
case, Driessen and Tijs (1985) provide a necessary and sufficient
condition for the τ -value to belong to the core in semiconvex games,
which include GEGN.
6. EXAMPLES AND APPLICATIONS
Consider, again, the game of provision of public goods (Example
1 in Section 2). In this section we provide some examples of this
class of games, and find the proportional solutions and the τ -value.
We also show that, for these games, the Shapley value and the pro-
portional solution coincide. Next we show some examples of joint
ventures (Example 2 in Section 2).
EXAMPLE 3. Provision of public goods: v (S) = (∑i∈S βi)2 /2
Case 1.1: Two players, β = (1, 2). In this case, v (1) = 0.5, v (2) =
2, v (1, 2) = 4.5. The proportional solution is p1 = 134.5 = 1.5, and
p2 = 234.5 = 3. We can compare this solution with the Lindahl solu-
tion for public goods, which requires solving the following prob-
lems.
maxa,yi ui = βiad − yi
s.t. πiad = πyyi + λimax
for i = 1, 2, and
maxa,y  = (π1 + π2) as − πyy
s.t. y = a22 .
In these problems, πi is the personalized price that Player i pays
to consume the public good, πy is the price of the public good,
λ1 + λ2 = 1, and max is  evaluated at the maximum. Market
clearing conditions are as = as , y1 + y2 = y. The solution for this
problem when λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 1 is (a, y1, y2) = (3, 3, 1.5) , with(
π1, π2, πy
) = (1, 2, 1), and (u1, u2) = (0, 4.5) . On the other hand,
when λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0 we get (a, y1, y2) = (3,−1.5, 6), with(
π1, π2, πy
) = (1, 2, 1), and (u1, u2) = (4.5, 0). Any convex com-
bination between vectors (0, 4.5), and (4.5, 0) can be obtained for
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other values of λ1 and λ2. The proportional solution p (v) = (1.5, 3)
is obtained if (λ1, λ2) =
(1
3,
2
3
)
. In the Lindahl solution, the techno-
logy is only available to the owners of the firm, who are the players
themselves, but in different proportions. On the other hand, in the
proportional solution it is implicitly assumed that the technology is
available to all players and coalitions, thus imposing a minimum
utility for the players. This is the main reason for the difference in
the solutions.
Case 1.2. Three players, β = (1, 2, 3) . In this case v (1) = 0.5,
v (2) = 2, v (3) = 4.5, v (1, 2) = 4.5, v (1, 3) = 8, v (2, 3) = 12.5,
and v (1, 2, 3) = 18. The proportional solution is p (v) = (3, 6, 9).
In this example we calculate the τ -value using the formula in the
previous section and compare the two solutions.
First calculate the vector of superior bounds,
Mv = (18 − 12.5, 18 − 8, 18 − 4.5)
= (5.5, 10, 13.5) .
To calculate the vector of inferior bounds, mv, we have
mv1 = max
S⊂N\{1}

v

S ∪ {1} −∑
j∈S
Mvj




= max{18 − (10 + 13.5) , 4.5 − 10, 8 − 13.5}
= − 5, 5.
Similarly, mv2 = −1, and mv3 = 2.5. Then δ = 18−(−4)5.5+10+13.5−(−4) =
2
3 , and
τ (v) = 1
3
(−5.5,−1, 2.5) + 2
3
(5.5, 10, 13.5)
= (1.833, 6.333, 9.833) .
Case 1.3. Three players, β = (2, 2, 3) . In this case v (1) = 2,
v (2) = 2, v (3) = 4.5, v (1, 2) = 8, v (1, 3) = 12.5, v (2, 3) =
12.5, and v (1, 2, 3) = 24.5. The proportional solution is p (v) =
(7, 7, 10.5), while the τ -value is τ (v) = (6.666, 6.666, 11.166).
The last two cases suggest that the proportional solution tends to
provide a more egalitarian distribution. Although we do not have a
general proof of this result, many other examples agree with it.
18
One may wonder about the performance of the Shapley value
in this class of games. The next proposition shows the remarkable
result that it coincides with the proportional solution.
PROPOSITION 6. Let v be a GEG with α = 2 and r (s) = k.
Then Sh (v) = p (v).
Proof. First see that Sh (v) satisfies EF by definition. Also notice
that ADD implies RL Then it only remains to show that the Shapley
value satisfies IPR for this class of games. I.e., we have to show that
if v (N) ≥ ∑i∈N βi , then Shi(v, β) ≥ βi .
We first prove that IPR is indeed satisfied when k = 1. In this
case v (N) ≥ ∑i∈N βi means (∑i∈N βi)2 ≥ ∑i∈N βi , which is
equivalent to
∑
i∈N βi ≥ 1.
The formula for the Shapley value in (3) can be written as
Shi(v) =
∑
i /∈T
t ! (n − t − 1)!
n!
[
(v (T ∪ {i}) − v (T )) + (v (T C ∪ {i})− v (T C))]
2
,
where T C is N\ (T ∪ {i}). This is true because t ! = (n − tC − 1)!,
and (n − t − 1)! = tC !, where tC is the cardinal of coalition T C .
Now we have
1
2
(v (T ∪ {i}) − v (T )) + (v (T C ∪ {i})− v (T C))
= 1
2



 ∑
k∈T∪{i}
βk


2
−
(∑
k∈T
βk
)2
+

 ∑
k∈T C∪{i}
βk


2
−

∑
k∈T C
βk


2


= β2i +
(∑
k∈T
βk
)
βi +

∑
k∈T C
βk

βi
= β2i +

 ∑
k∈N\{i}
βk

βi
= βi

βi + ∑
k∈N\{i}
βk

 = βi ∑
k∈N
βk.
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The last term is greater or equal than βi as long as
∑
k∈N βk ≥ 1.
In this case, the Shapley value of Player i is a weighted average
of terms greater than or equal to βi , thus Shi (v) ≥ βi whenever
v (N) ≥∑i∈N βi , as required by IPR.
The fact that the Shapley value and the proportional solution co-
incide when k = 1 along with RL imply that the two concepts also
coincide for all k ≥ 0. This completes the proof.
Another way to read the last proposition is that, for this class
of games, the proportional solution provides a very simple formula
to compute the Shapley value. Both the proportional solution and
the Shapley value are computed using a linear formula, and both are
characterized by a linear property (ADD in case of the Shapley value
and RL in the case of the proportional solution). However there is
no way to identify a priori the appropriate version of linearity that
characterizes a given solution.
The next example shows that the coincidence between the Shap-
ley value and the proportional solution cannot be generalized for the
whole class of GEG.
EXAMPLE 4. Joint venture: v(S) = (∑i∈S Li)α (sK)δ .
Case 2.1. Three players, β = L = (1, 1, 2), α = 2, K = 1, δ = 1.
Then v (1) = v (2) = 1, v (3) = 2, v (1, 2) = 4, v (1, 3) =
v (2, 3) = 6, and v (1, 2, 3) = 12. The proportional solution is
p (v) = (3, 3, 6), while the Shapley value is Sh (v) = (216 , 216 , 306 ) .
7. CONCLUSION
We have defined GEG as a generalization of externality games. The
different families of GEG have the structure of a vectorial space
with minimum participation games as a base. This property makes
an interesting characterization of the proportional solution possible.
The relations between other properties of GEG and solutions are
also explored. One interesting feature that may deserve more atten-
tion is the relation between GEG and financial games, as they share
many properties, although the two classes of games are not related
by inclusion.
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